We examine the effect of an increase of aviation fuel tax on the reductions of fuel consumption and carbon emissions using data from the US airline industry. Despite the growing importance of the aviation sector's contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions, there are few empirical studies on the impact of aviation fuel tax on fuel consumption and emission reductions. Our contribution is to estimate from historical data how effective fuel tax could be as a tool to abate emissions from the aviation industry.
carriers from 1994 to 2012 suggest that the price elasticities of jet fuel consumption are -0.454 at the 0.1 consumption quantile and -0.324 at the 0.2 consumption quantile. The price elasticities at other quantile points are not statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level. Based on the estimation results, we estimated the aviation fuel consumption effect resulting from a 4.3-cent aviation fuel tax increase, which is the highest increase of aviation fuel tax in the US during the analysis period. Then, we multiply the aviation fuel consumption effect by the fraction of CO2 emissions from US carriers' flights in each year to obtain the percentage change due to the aviation fuel tax in total CO2 emissions in the US. The calculation using values in 2011 suggests that a 4.3-cent aviation fuel tax increase would reduce CO2 emissions in the US by about 0.000182% for carriers at the 0.1 consumption quantile and 0.000130% for carriers at the 0.2 consumption quantile. Keywords: fuel tax; fuel consumption; carbon emissions; US airline industry JEL Codes: H23; R11; R48 1 Background Cap and trade and a fuel tax are closely related but different policies in terms of reducing the amount of carbon emissions. Although a cap-and-trade system constrains the aggregate emissions by creating a monetary value of emissions for trading with allocating a limited number of free emission allowances, a fuel tax cannot determine the amount of the reductions in carbon emissions in advance. Thus, the idea of a cap-andtrade system is becoming widely accepted as a more certain approach to achieve environmental objectives and targets than a fuel tax. The European Union (EU) launched its Emission Trading System (EU ETS) in 2005. Since the beginning of 2012, the system covers CO2 emissions produced by aviation activity which includes all flights within the European Union and between countries participating in the EU ETS (EC, 2006) . However, if the emissions price drops too low, incentives to reduce emissions will also be reduced. Indeed, the EU ETS "faces a challenge in the form of a growing surplus of allowances, largely because of the economic crisis which has depressed emissions more than anticipated" since 2009 (European Commission (EC), 2014). According to the EC, the surplus stood at almost two billion allowances in early 2012. In the longer term, it could negatively affect the ability of the EU ETS to reduce emissions. A critically important element is the establishment of a market determined price for EU allowances (Miyoshi, 2014) . The EU ETS system designed in 2012 will not produce the substantial emission reduction from air transport (Vespermann and Wald, 2011) due to the current low carbon price in the market.
Yet, the market-based measures (MBMs) can be cost effective, though, the effect is limited and the combination together with other economic instruments, such as fuel tax, can be possible as compatible instruments.
In light of these circumstances, it is worthwhile to examine the effect of an increase of fuel tax on the reductions of fuel consumption and emissions. Even though a fuel tax cannot control the amount of emissions, it may possibly contribute to the reduction of emissions, and thus could be an important complementary tool for CO2 emissions reduction policy. This paper, hence, aims to estimate how effective fuel tax could be as a tool to abate emissions from the aviation activity by using the historical data in the United States from 1997 to 2013.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous studies and identifies the different impacts of fuel tax and the emission trading system. The methodologies, models, and data used are explained n Section 3. The results are presented and discussed in Section 4. The effect of an increase of aviation fuel tax on the reductions of fuel consumption and carbon emissions are estimated in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes with a discussion.
Previous studies
As long as the authors' limited knowledge, only two countries, the USA and Japan, impose the aviation fuel tax to the commercial airlines. In Japan, the aviation fuel tax system has been established as a financial resource to develop and manage airports in Japan. The eleven thirteenth of the total revenue of fuel tax is allocated to 'Airport Special Account' since 1972. The rest of them are distributed to the Treasury.
In the US case, the revenues from the arrival/ departure tax, federal aviation fuel tax and other taxes goes to the General fund and transferred to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, which covers all of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airports' facilities, equipment and development and support over 75% of FAA's operation and management (Button, 2005) . Hence, those aviation fuel taxes have been introduced and used for developing, operating, and managing airports as one of the key financial resources.
The key role of air transport industry has been widely discussed for reducing the Green House Gas (GHG) emissions to contribute to the climate change challenge. One of the important measures is the economic instrument for reducing the emissions such as 'emission trading scheme (ETS) ' and 'environment tax'. Hofer et al, (2010) investigates how air travel emissions taxation would affect carbon emissions levels across multiple transport modes by using the US domestic market. They assumed an emission tax-driven fare increase of 2 % and an own-price elasticity of -1.15, this results in an estimated demand decrease by about 2.3% and a decrease in carbon emissions of over 2.5 million tonnes (5billion lbs) in 2014. However, about one third of the saving in air travel carbon emissions could be offset by the rise in vehicle emissions. Sgouridis et al (2011) estimated the impact of market based mechanism by using carbon price change on the carbon reduction by two scenarios: a real price of a metric tonnes of CO2 to be USD 50 in 2005 constant dollars and USD 200 per tonne, which are equivalent to increase in the kerosene price in the range of USD 0.5 to 2 per gallon of fuel. The impact on both demand and emissions is minimal in case of USD 50 per tonne of CO2, while it becomes a significant reduction for the USD 200 per tonne's case.
Strictly speaking, fuel tax and the trading scheme are different (Ison et al., 2002) .
The advantage of the trading scheme is that the regulator can set a clear target compared to that of tax. The tradable permits increase the polluters' choice to reduce their emissions, such as through technology investment, production reduction (cutting capacity), purchase of permits, or moving routes. As a result, it works by reducing the total abatement cost to achieve a target, which low-cost abatement airlines can sell to high-cost abatement airlines. In addition, the tradable permits do not have an inflation effect as they are traded at a market price, compared to the tax regulation. The inflation reduces the real value of the environment tax. Thus, the tradable permits can be more cost effective compared to a tax-based system.
The tradable permits, however, also bring several issues with them. Firstly, the initial allocation is very important for the emitters (airlines), as it is allocated based on the market share during the monitoring year to set allocation rate based on the benchmark.
As a result, the total amount of emissions in the monitoring year increases. This is very contradictory outcome, though, often happens in other sectors (Miyoshi, 2014) . In fact, some LCCs carried freight and mails in their bellies during the monitoring year. Secondary, the tradable permit becomes a barrier to entry, which causes anti-competitive issues in the market for new entrants. In addition, the monitoring and implementation cost becomes a burden for airlines as they represent additional costs, especially for small-sized airlines.
The most crucial issue is the carbon price. The current carbon market price is considerably low (around € 5 in April 2014 (Point carbon, 2014) . If the carbon prices remain low, emitters (airlines) prefer purchasing carbon allowances over investing to reduce emissions. The carbon price should be high for the effective reduction (Sgouridis et al, 2011 ) by a restrictive ETS design (Vespermann and Wald, 2011) . Furthermore, both tax and emission trading scheme have equity issues (Button, 2005; Miyoshi, 2014) . This first multi-national emission trading scheme has raised many regulatory issues and objections including the Chicago Convention. The cost effective measure, ETS produces 'winners and losers' among participants as a result, based on the timing of the scheme implemented. For global ETS mechanism, equity issues among airlines and countries cannot be avoided. Recent study estimates 92% of fuel burn takes place in the northern hemisphere, in which 67% of fuel burn occurs between 30 degree North and 60 degree North (Simone et al., 2013) .
There is strong opposition for MBMs (both tax and the ETS), though, those instruments could be crucial, where the amount of carbon emitted should be reduced drastically. In case of automobile fuel taxing, Sterner (2007) argued that equity effects become considerably small when the tax is proportionally allocated together with other policies.
Indeed, fuel tax has not been originally designed for environmental proposed, though, it acts environmentally by reducing the fuel usage and emissions as a result (Sterner, 2007) .
In addition, it can be a supplemental tool with combination together with the ETS by making up the drawbacks of both of the instruments (fuel tax and ETS) in particular for the global MBM implementation. To the best of our knowledge, there are few empirical studies on the impact of aviation fuel tax on fuel consumption and emission reductions (Owen, et al., 2010; Preston, et al., 2012; Sgouridis, et al., 2011; Vespermann and Wald, 2011) . Our contribution, hence, is to estimate from historical data how effective fuel tax could be as a tool to abate emissions from the aviation industry.
3 Model and data 1
Model for carrier-level panel data
Our basic estimation model is given by the following specification, which is commonly used in previous studies (cf., Davis and Kilian, 2011; Kim, et al., 2011) .
The suggests that it should be assumed that the jet fuel price, pit, is correlated with timeconstant carrier characteristic, ci. Pooled OLS is biased and inconsistent if pit and ci is correlated. Therefore, to eliminate ci, we first-difference Eq.
(1) and the resulting Eq. (2) is estimated by the pooled OLS. This means that we identify the magnitude of the response of carrier's fuel consumption to changes of jet fuel price rather than to levels of jet fuel price.
where we use the fact that θt -θ(t -1) =θ.
As we use a log-log functional form, the coefficient of interest, γ, shows the price elasticity of jet fuel consumption.
Instrumental variable
One advantage of using carrier-level panel data is that it allows us to control unobservable carrier characteristics that influence fuel consumption and price simultaneously. The above estimation approach, however, does not address the issue of price endogeneity: an increase of fuel consumption could lead to an increase of fuel price.
In addition, the price elasticity of jet fuel consumption estimated by the above models does not identify the changes in fuel consumption resulting from price movements due to tax increases.
In order to address the issue of endogeneity as well as to estimate the effect of jet fuel tax on consumption of jet fuel, we employ an instrumental variable approach. We use aviation fuel tax (Source: US IRS, Publication 510), which is shown in Table 1 , as an instrument for the endogenous variable, i.e., jet fuel price (pit). This approach enables us to identify only those movements in fuel prices that are driven by fuel tax changes.
Consequently, we are able to estimate the effect of aviation fuel tax on consumption of jet fuel and emissions of carbon dioxide.
[ Table 3 shows the negative and statistically significant coefficient estimates for the jet fuel price, which are obtained from the pooled OLS. The estimation result with controls shown in Column 2 of Table 3 suggests that the price elasticity of jet fuel consumption is -0.389. The estimated effect of an increase of price on fuel consumption is not large, but the sign of the coefficient confirms our expectation. However, as we suggested, the pooled OLS does not address the issue of price endogeneity. Thus, we employ an instrumental variable approach, which uses aviation fuel tax as an instrument for jet fuel price (pit). Generally, the fuel tax rise increases the price of jet fuel, which is expected to lead to reduced consumption of jet fuel. Surprisingly, the coefficient estimates from the instrumental variable approach, which are shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 , suggest that the price elasticity of jet fuel consumption is not statistically significant. The results, which are contradictory to our expectation, are puzzling because the coefficient of the instrumental variable, the aviation fuel tax, is statistically significant and the diagnostic tests suggest that the instrument could be regarded as valid for the endogenous variable (the jet fuel price).
[ were infrequent (only 3 times during the analysis period) and small in size (43 cents increase, 1 cent decrease, and 1 cent increase), the variation in the jet fuel price due to the changes of fuel tax rate is relatively small compared to historic volatility in jet fuel prices.
This may hinder the aviation fuel tax to show its impact on the jet fuel consumption. In To examine the above possibility and obtain a more complete picture, we reestimate Eq.
(2) by quantile regression, which allows us to examine the impact of a covariate on the full distribution or any particular percentile of the distribution, not just the conditional mean (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Cameron and Trivedi, 2010) . Table 4 reports fuel price coefficients from quantile regressions, which provide information about the relationship between the jet fuel consumption and the jet fuel price at different points in the conditional distribution of the jet fuel consumption. As expected, the jet fuel price has a greater impact at the lower quantiles (q=0.1, 0.2, and 0.3) and the upper quantile (q=0.7, 0.8, and 0.9) than at the middle quantiles (q=0.4, 0.5, and 0.6) of jet fuel consumption. OLS coefficient differs considerably from the quantile regression coefficients, which suggest that the OLS estimate of the price elasticity of jet fuel consumption is biased towards minus one.
[ Lee (2007) . The QIV estimator uses a control function approach to address endogeneity. The basic idea of the control function approach is to derive an additional regressor that controls for the part of the endogenous variable pit that correlates with the error term uit due to reverse causation between the jet fuel consumption yit and the jet fuel price pit. The structural error uit could be a function of the first stage error vit: uit = φvit + ψ, when we have an instrumental variable z, which is unrelated to uit conditional on covariates. ψ is unrelated to vit by definition. Thus, we can correct for endogeneity, when we construct estimated residuals it from the quantile regression of pit on covariates in the first stage, and regress yit on pit, covariates, and it in the second stage. The new structural error is independent of the endogenous variable pit, if we introduce it in Eq.
(2) along with pit. The estimated first stage error it, which is an additional regressor in Eq.
(2), controls for endogeneity in Eq.
(2). This approach is viewed as a variant of control function approach (Lee, 2007; Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2013; Kowalski, 2013) .
[ Table 5 reports fuel price coefficients from quantile instrumental variable regressions, which show that only the coefficients at the 0.1 and 0.2 quantiles are statistically different from zero at least at the 5 percent level. The price elasticities of jet fuel consumption are -0.454 at the 0.1 quantile and -0.324 at the 0.2 quantile. The price elasticities at other quantile points are not statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level. We regard these as the most credible estimates. The results suggest that the average relationship between the jet fuel consumption and the movements in fuel prices, which is shown in Column 1 of Table 5 , tells us only a small part of what has been happening in jet fuel consumption as we presumed. Indeed, an increase of fuel price due to fuel tax seems to have a larger impact to smaller carriers than to larger carriers. As explained above, the jet fuel price pit reflects contractual and storage advantages and disadvantages of each carrier. In general, larger carriers enjoy these advantages due to their large-volume contracts and higher storage capacity, e.g., by using hedging strategy. The relative advantage of larger carriers in terms of fuel cost may make it possible for them to minimize the effect of an increase of fuel tax. In contrast, smaller carriers that lack such advantages may be significantly affected by a fuel tax increase. Probably the effect of aviation fuel tax on jet fuel consumption would be different depending on consumption quantiles, as a result. The above calculation implicitly assumes that tax increase would affect all carriers to an equal degree. This implicit assumption is debatable in light of the results of our quantile instrumental variable estimation, which suggest that an increase of fuel price due to fuel tax has a larger impact to smaller carriers in lower consumption quantiles (0.1 and 0.2) than to larger carriers in other consumption quantiles. The fraction of fuel consumption for carriers that falls in the lower consumption quantile (0.2 or below) is only 0.00391 in 2011 3 . Undoubtedly, the amounts of the reduction of CO2 emissions are overestimated under the above assumption. Therefore, we recalculated the reduction of CO2 emissions by taking into account the fraction of fuel consumption for carriers that falls in the lower consumption quantile. The recalculation shows that a 4.3-cent increase of aviation fuel tax decreases carbon emissions by about 0.000182% for carriers at the 0.1 quantile and 0.000130% for carriers at the 0.2 quantile.
An additional implicit assumption of the above estimation is that the aviation fuel tax would be passed through fully to carriers. However, if the aviation fuel suppliers bear part of the fuel tax burden, the reductions of fuel consumption and carbon emissions caused by the fuel tax would fall further. In order to examine the pass-through rate of aviation fuel tax to aviation fuel price, we regressed changes in aviation fuel prices on changes in aviation fuel tax (cf., Davis and Kilian, 2011; Marion and Muehlegger, 2011) .
[ Table 6 : Effect of a change of aviation fuel tax on the change of jet fuel price, January 1996 -December 2012] Table 6 shows that the price elasticity obtained from the OLS estimate is 0.0123.
An increase of aviation fuel price due to a 1 percent fuel tax increase, which can be calculated by multiplying the after-tax aviation fuel price at the given time by the estimated price elasticity (0.0123), is equal to a 1 percent increase of aviation fuel tax multiplied by the pass-through rate of aviation fuel tax to carriers. Thus, calculated at the mean value of the after-tax aviation fuel price in 2011 (1.461 US dollars per gallon) and the value of the aviation fuel tax in 2011 (0.044 US dollars per gallon), the pass-through rate of aviation fuel tax to carriers in 2011 is about 41 percent (0.0123 × 1.461 / 0.044 × 100 = 41%). This value suggests that less than half of the aviation fuel tax is shifted to carriers, which may lead to a lower reduction of CO2 emissions.
Conclusion
We examined the effect of an aviation fuel tax increase on the reductions of fuel consumption and carbon emissions using data from the US airline industry. Our quantile instrumental variable estimates from the unbalanced monthly panel of US carriers from 1994 to 2012 suggest that the price elasticity of jet fuel consumption is different depending on consumption quantiles, which means the effect of aviation fuel tax on jet fuel consumption is also different depending on consumption quantiles. The results suggest that only carriers that fall in the lower consumption quantile (0.2 or below) have reduced aviation fuel consumption in response to a tax increase. However, the price elasticities of jet fuel consumption are very low: -0.454 at the 0.1 consumption quantile and -0.324 at the 0.2 consumption quantile. The price elasticities at other quantile points are not statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level. Because of the low price easticities and the low fraction of carriers affected by fuel tax in terms of fuel consumption, the expected reduction of CO2 emissions resulting from a 4.3-cent aviation fuel tax increase, which is the highest increase of aviation fuel tax in the US during the analysis period, is also significantly low: 0.000182% for carriers at the 0.1 consumption quantile and 0.000130% for carriers at the 0.2 consumption quantile. In addition, the pass-through rate of aviation fuel tax to carriers is small as well: about 41% in 2011. In sum, our estimates from historical data suggest that the expected reduction of CO2 emissions resulting from an increase of aviation fuel tax is almost negligible. Figure 2 suggests that annual CO2 emissions from commercial flights in the US have been increasing steadily, which lead to a higher proportion of CO2 emissions from the aviation sector in the US. The amount of CO2 emissions from the aviation sector is small compared to the total amount of CO2 emissions: less than 3.5% in 2011. The annual increase rate of CO2 emissions from the aviation sector is also not so high: 4.1% in 2011. However, this rate is significantly higher than the almost negligible reduction of CO2 emissions resulting from an aviation fuel tax increase (e.g., 4.3-cent).
Considering the growing contribution of the aviation sector to global GHG emissions and the recent challenges of the EU ETS to control an effective carbon price, these results indicate some important implications. The results of our analysis suggest that the effectiveness of fuel tax as a policy tool to control for the CO2 emissions from the aviation sector is not remarkable. But it is also suggested that the fuel tax has certainly contributed to the reduction of CO2 emissions, even though the scope and size of its impact is fairly limited and small. It may act as an effective instrument to reduce CO2 emissions as a supplemental role, and controllable compared to the carbon price. The combination effects can be analyzed as the further study.
Another interesting finding is that the levels of the impact vary among the size of carriers. Equity consideration is a key element for developing the economic instruments, such as tax and ETS (Button, 2005; Eliasson and Mattsson, 2006; Small and Verhoef, 2007) . A de minimis exemption to exclude small emitters (small fuel users) can be considered. An effective tax regime and MBMs needs to be developed to address the uneven effects of fuel tax on fuel consumption and CO2 emissions in the aviation sector. Month and year dummies are omitted for brevity. Lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals were obtained from 500 bootstrap replications. Month and year effects are omitted for brevity. 
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